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Abstract
QBism is an agent-centered interpretation of quantum theory. It rejects the notion that quantum
theory provides a God’s eye description of reality and claims instead that it imposes constraints on
agents’ subjective degrees of belief. QBism’s emphasis on subjective belief has led critics to dismiss
it as antirealism or instrumentalism, or even, idealism or solipsism. The aim of this paper is to
consider the relation of QBism to scientific realism. I argue that while QBism is an unhappy fit with
a standard way of thinking about scientific realism, an alternative conception I call ”perspectival
normative realism” may allow for a reconciliation.
1 Introduction
QBism is an interpretation inspired by the central role played by information in contem-
porary applications of quantum theory. Accordingly, the emphasis of QBists is on the
application of quantum theory by agents intervening on the world. The guiding idea of
QBism—which originally stood for ‘quantum Bayesianism’—is that the probabilities de-
livered by quantum theory are to be understood as degrees of belief along the lines of
the subjective Bayesian approach to probability (Caves et al., 2002). Since its original
proposal, the view has evolved and attracted new followers in the physics community, but
has been less warmly received by philosophers. Many, it seems, share the view of Hagar
(2003) that “Fuchs’ ‘thin’ realism, and the entire ‘fog from the north’ which inspires it,
are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise” (p.772).1 However, this is at odds with the
1 For other critiques of QBism, see Timpson (2008); Bacciagaluppi (2014); Norsen (2016); Brown (2017);
Earman (2018).
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avowed realism of QBists such as Fuchs (2017b) and Mermin (2014).
The aim of this paper is to clarify the status of QBism with respect to scientific realism.
This issue is of importance not just for those with an interest in QBism and other “non-
ontic” approaches to quantum theory (e.g, Healey (2012, 2017b); Friederich (2013)), but
also serves to test the limits of scientific realism in the context of quantum theory. QBism
proposes a non-standard understanding of the relation of a scientific theory to the world,
and as such, casts the question of realism in a new light. At the very least, the following
investigation should make clear that the question of realism about quantum theory is more
complex than it may at first seem.2
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces QBism and some of its core
motivations. Section 3 assesses QBism under a standard conception of scientific realism,
which gives rise to several problems. Section 4 seeks to take seriously the agent-centered
and prescriptive aspects of QBism to motivate an altogether different approach: perspec-
tival normative realism. Finally, section 5 considers realism in the context of normative
theories to make the case that perspectival normative realism—and hence, QBism itself—
may legitimately claim to be a form of realism.
2 What is QBism?
The empirical support for quantum theory consists in the success of its probabilistic pre-
dictions. Every opportunity taken to test quantum theory has vindicated its predictions
over those of potential rivals. In the standard formalism, these predictions follow from the
quantum state ascribed to a system and the Born rule. QBism maintains that these prob-
abilities are subjective degrees of belief of some agent concerning what she will experience,
e.g., upon performing a measurement of some observable. Moreover, the sole function of
2 Cf., Healey (2018), who attempts to broaden the understanding of scientific realism along pragmatist
lines to accommodate his account of quantum theory.
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the quantum state is to encode the agent’s information (or subjective beliefs) associated
with the system.3 So why would one adopt a subjectivist interpretation of quantum theory?
There are several kinds of arguments put forth by QBists. One family of arguments
notes the unifying power of taking the quantum state to be epistemic. The idea is that
certain puzzling features of quantum theory follow naturally from the epistemic approach.
A notable example here is Spekkens (2007), which seeks to show that a purely classical
theory—Spekkens toy model—can reproduce a number of “quantum” effects if states are
understood epistemically. For example, the no cloning theorem that prohibits perfect du-
plication of a quantum state is shown to hold in the toy model. Of course, Spekken’s model
is quite limited in its application and cannot recover the full content of quantum theory.
Nevertheless, QBists maintain that it goes far enough to demonstrate the explanatory
virtues of an epistemic view of quantum states; features such as no-cloning that appear
unexplained or ad hoc on the ontic view are given a natural explanation on the epistemic
view.
The other sort of argument maintains that various conceptual puzzles that dog the
interpretation of quantum theory are dissolved by adopting the subjective epistemic view-
point. According to advocates, the process of measurement and the presence of non-local
phenomena are described simply and without paradox by QBism. Measurement involves
simply updating one’s subjective beliefs about future experiences on the basis of new infor-
mation. Non-locality doesn’t arise in an EPR experiment because each agent–Alice, Bob,
an agent at the source—has their own quantum state which reflects their individual beliefs.
3 The QBist should avoid saying that the quantum state encodes beliefs about the system because this
suggests that the system has an underlying ontic state that is the target of the agent’s beliefs. As discussed
below, this “epistemic ontological” view (Spekkens, 2007) runs into difficulties, such as the no go theorem of
(Pusey et al., 2012). So, strictly speaking, the quantum state encodes an agent’s beliefs about their future
experiences that are associated with the physical system—e.g., what they will experience when performing
a measurement of it. That said, it will often be useful to speak of “measurement outcomes” and “the
quantum state of a system,” which should be taken to be eliptical for more careful expressions of the sort
just mentioned.
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A distant measurement has no effect on an agent’s beliefs (until they become aware of it),
so nothing in the vicinity of Bob changes when Alice performs her measurement.4
QBism also manages to avoid the various “no go” results surrounding epistemic ap-
proaches. For instance, the PBR theorem (Pusey et al., 2012) rules out a version of the
epistemic approach in which the quantum state represents our uncertainty about the un-
derlying ontic state of a physical system. QBism—and other non-ontic views, such as
Healey’s pragmatist approach—avoid the PBR theorem by rejecting this understanding of
epistemic states. QBism rejects that there is an underlying ontic state about which we are
unsure, rather, it contends that we have degrees of belief about our own future experiences
only. This may lead to charges of idealism or solipsism, but the QBist need only deny
that quantum states encode credences over unknown ontic states of the physical systems
to which they are applied. The QBist is free to believe that objective reality exists and
that quantum theory can tell us about it in some other, more indirect manner.5
In sum, QBism attempts to give a picture of quantum theory in which agents use
quantum theory to guide their degrees of belief about potential future experiences. QBists
reject the standard realist assumption that to interpret quantum theory is to say how it de-
scribes external reality. Indeed, QBists often forsake the external, “God’s eye” perspective
altogether in favor of a diversity of different agent-centered perspectives on the quantum
world.
4 This does not preclude the presence of some form of non-locality. For instance, one may argue that
when Alice and Bob compare results, they will find non-local correlations in measurement outcomes. The
QBist may wish to treat such a revelation as simply Alice performing another (local) measurement, but
doing so relegates Bob’s testimony to merely an aspect of Alice’s experience, arguably moving us closer to
solipsism (see, Norsen (2016); Earman (2018)).
5 Alternatively, one may view QBism as not rejecting ontic states, but rather as conceiving of them more
broadly. In other words, one could allow that there is something about which we are being epistemic, but
deny that it’s of the right character to function as PBR and Bell assume for their λs—there are no “local
beables” over which our subjective probabilities range. Whichever strategy is adopted, the point is that
some epistemic views may be ruled out by the no go theorems, and QBism is recommended by remaining
viable in light of them. Thanks to [xxxx] for emphasizing this alternative.
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3 Standard Scientific Realism
While there remains disagreement about the correct formulation of scientific realism, many
follow Psillos (1999) in identifying three main components of the view, roughly:
Metaphysical realism: a recognition of the existence of a mind-independent reality.
Semantic realism: a commitment to interpret theories literally,
Epistemic claim: a commitment to the approximate truth of our best confirmed theories.
As noted above, QBism is occasionally dismissed as solipsism or idealism. After all, on
this view quantum theory functions as a user’s manual that guides agents’ beliefs about
their own future experiences. However, the QBist needn’t deny that there is a reality
external to the agent. Indeed, Fuchs offers the following support for metaphysical realism:
We believe in a world external to ourselves precisely because we find ourselves
getting unpredictable kicks (from the world) all the time. (Fuchs, 2017b)
What QBism denies is that models in quantum theory should be viewed as third-personal
descriptions of external reality, but this doesn’t bear on metaphysical realism, which they
are free to adopt for other reasons.
Assessing the status of the other two aspects of standard scientific realism with respect
to QBism is less straightforward. First, consider semantic realism. The commitment to take
a theory literally fits most naturally with scientific theories presented in linguistic form (e.g.,
as a set of partially-interpreted sentences that function as its axioms). Semantic realism
is intended to rule out views such as logical positivism that seek to reinterpret certain
sentences so as to avoid making reference to putative unobservable entities. But, this view
is not an easy fit with theories in contemporary physics which are more naturally associated
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with a family of mathematical models. Here it is unclear what would be meant by taking
some piece of mathematics literally. Second, the concept of approximate truth that figures
in the epistemic claim also requires explication. In the context of a linguistically-presented
scientific theory, perhaps this can be made out in terms of the successful reference of
central terms (Laudan, 1981), but on a model-based approach the notion is harder to pin
down. One must locate some relation between models and the world capable of playing an
analogous role to successful reference in the linguistic case.
As a starting point, consider a simple version of scientific realism about models that is
clearly at odds with QBism. It maintains that models mirror the world, in the following
sense:
Mirroring Account: The models associated with successful scientific theories mirror reality
in that each element of a model corresponds to an element of reality.
While few would accept the Mirroring Account as stated, it plays an important role in
several debates in the philosophy of science. For instance, van Fraassen (1980) uses a
version of the Mirroring Account to characterize the realist alternative to his constructive
empiricism. First, he presents his semantic view of theories:
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and sec-
ondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as
candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena. The struc-
tures which can be described in experimental and measurement reports we can
call appearances: the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such
that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model.
(van Fraassen, 1980, p.64)
He continues later:
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With this new picture of theories in mind, we can distinguish between two
epistemic attitudes we can take up toward a theory. We can assert it to be true
(i.e., to have a model which is a faithful replica, in all detail, of our world),
and call for belief; or we can simply assert its empirical adequacy, calling for
acceptance as such. (van Fraassen, 1980, pp.68–69, emphasis added)
Thus, for van Fraassen, constructive empiricism is distinguished from realism by denying
that all parts of models correspond to aspects of our world. This paints a picture of realism
very close to the Mirroring Account sketched above.
QBism is clearly at odds with the flat-footed realism of the Mirroring Account. Most—
although not all—elements of the models used in quantum theory do not correspond to
elements of reality. In particular, quantum states and their evolution are features of quan-
tum models with no counterpart in mind-independent reality. Thus, if scientific realism is
understood in this way, QBism is not a realist position, despite the claims of its proponents.
But is the Mirroring Account plausible? While it may have a certain intuitive appeal,
there are several reasons to think it’s overly naïve. First, the models used in contemporary
physics typically contain artifacts of the representation. For instance, gauge quantities such
as the field potentials in classical electromagnetism are generally regarded as artifacts.6
More generally, it is implausible to suppose that each term that appears in an equation
corresponds to an element of reality. What, for example, is the worldly counterpart of the
gravitational constant G in Newton’s law of universal gravitation?7
6 Of course, the status of gauge quantities is controversial. Even the view that electromagnetic potentials
are non-physical leads to difficulties in the context of the Aharanov-Bohm effect (Leeds, 1999; Nounou,
2003; Healey, 2007). But, regardless of one’s view on this particular case, it remains plausible that many
of the models deployed by contemporary physics contain some measure of “surplus stucture” (Redhead,
2003).
7 One may try to view G as a property of the gravitational force between massive bodies—its
“proportionality”—but, it’s unclear whether such an abstract property is the right sort of thing to count
as an element of reality in this context. It seems far more natural to regard the force as corresponding to
Gm1m2
r2
leaving G on its own as having no specific counterpart in reality.
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Second, even taken as whole, models don’t seem to stand in a one-to-one relation with
reality as the Mirroring Account suggests. One place in which this issue arises is the hole
argument in general relativity (Earman and Norton, 1987). In this case we have distinct
models (M and d∗M) related by a “hole diffeomorphism” that seem to describe different
states of affairs. However, general relativity treatsM and d∗M as physically equivalent. A
popular resolution to this tension is to regard the M and d∗M as different representations
of the same spacetime. This means that neither model can correspond to the world in
the sense of the Mirroring Account. At a minimum, there must be some looseness of fit
between models and the world.8
The implausibility of the Mirroring Account is unsurprising. In other terms, it means
that one cannot read off metaphysics directly from the mathematical models deployed in
physics, which is a point most working in the philosophy of physics would unreservedly
endorse (indeed, it may be seen as the basis for much of the work in the area). That said,
we should be careful to note what does not follow from rejecting the Mirroring Account. In
particular, two points are worth emphasizing: First, “mirroring” may still be a useful way
of viewing the relation of models to the world, so long as it’s not understood in the naïve
way expressed in the Mirroring Account. Second, while one cannot read off metaphysics
from physical models, it may still be seen as a virtue of one’s methodology to take them
at face value to the extent that it’s possible to do so.
8 There is a vast literature on the hole argument and its implications (see Norton (2011); Pooley (2013)).
It is not my aim here to enter into the debate, but rather to indicate a limitation of the Mirroring Account:
it leaves one unable to endorse the view that distinct models represent the same state of affairs. Leibniz
equivalence in the context of the hole argument is one well-known instance of this position, but it may be
inappropriate there and/or more appropriate elsewhere. At the very least, ruling out the possibility of such
representational redundancy seems problematic.
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3.1 Sophisticated Scientific Realism
A sophisticated scientific realist maintains that our best theories can tell us about the world,
but not in the simple manner of the Mirroring Account. In particular, the sophisticated
scientific realist seeks to distinguish the elements in our models that are genuine reflections
of reality from those that are merely artifacts of the representation. This task requires
substantial interpretative work and its results are often controversial, but so long as one
preserves the sense that models have latched onto the structure of the world, there is some
legitimacy to its claim to being a genuine form of scientific realism.
There are many varieties of sophisticated realism. Structural realism, for instance,
maintains that models capture only the structure of the world. Thus, individual elements
of theoretical models needn’t correspond to individual entities, but structural or relational
features do have worldly counterparts. For example, Worrall (1989) claims that Fresnel’s
equations do not describe genuine physical properties of a luminiferous ether—as Fresnel
supposed—but rather, reflect the structure underlying optical phenomena. Other versions
of this approach of selective skepticism are possible as well. One might countenance only
entities with certain causal features (Hacking, 1983), or those involved in novel predictive
successes (Psillos, 1999). Any such view of differential ontological commitment counts as
sophisticated scientific realism as understood here.9
Is QBism compatible with sophisticated scientific realism? Initially, one may think not.
After all, QBists deny that core elements of quantum models—quantum states and their
evolution—correspond to elements of reality. However, Fuchs urges that
...there is more to quantum mechanics than just three isolated terms (states,
evolution, and measurement)—there’s the full-blown theory that glues these
9 One might add a further requirement that the extent of ontological commitment must reach some
threshold, below which models are simply too remote from reality to qualify as realism. I discuss the
implications of this for QBism below.
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notions together in a very particular way, and in a way that would have never
been discovered without empirical science. (Fuchs, 2017b)
More specifically, recently QBists have placed increasing emphasis on the place of the Born
rule as an objective feature of reality. The Born rule is typically formulated as a function
that takes a quantum state to the probability of an observable taking a certain value or
the occurrence of a certain measurement outcome. For example, one may write the Born
rule for finding an eigenvalue ki of an observable O for a system in a pure state ψ:
p(ki|ψ) = 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 = |〈ki|ψ〉|2, (1)
where Pi is the projection onto the eigenspace of O corresponding to ki. However, given
their focus on subjective probabilities, QBists have sought to eliminate reference to the
misleading quantum state and formulate the Born rule entirely in terms of probabilities,
understood as subjective degrees of belief about (experiences of) measurement outcomes.
The resulting version of the Born rule is what QBists now call the “Essential Representa-
tion” (DeBrota et al., 2018).
The Essential Representation is cast in terms of hypothetical measurements called SICs
(Fuchs, 2010; Fuchs and Schack, 2013). Before describing SICs, we should note that the
Born rule can be stated in terms of more general measurements than those associated with
a projection onto the eigenspace of some Hermitian operator as assumed in equation 1. A
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) is a collection of positive semi-definite operators
Ei on a Hilbert space H such that
∑
iEi = I. In terms of POVMs, the Born rule takes
the simple form:
p(i|ρ) = trρEi (2)
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for an outcome i and an arbitrary quantum state ρ. A SIC is a symmetric, informationally
complete POVM. Formally, a SIC is a set of d2 rank-one projection operators Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi|
on a finite d-dimensional Hilbert space such that |〈ψi|ψj〉|2 = 1d+1 whenever i ̸= j. For now,
whether SICs exist for all finite values of d is an open research question.10 But, provided
the relevant SICs exist, we find that an arbitrary quantum state ρ can be expressed in terms
of a fiducial SIC measurement Πi and the probability p(i) of a subsequent measurement
result:
ρ =
∑
i=1
((d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)Πi. (3)
Consider a standard von Neumann measurement with outcomes Dj = |j〉〈j|. The
probability q(j) is given by the standard Born rule (equation 2). Now, suppose we perform
a SIC measurement with outcomes Hi before the von Neumann measurement. In this case,
we apply the law of total probability to arrive at the following:
s(j) =
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i), (4)
where p(i) is the probability of an outcome i of the SIC measurement, r(j|i) is the condi-
tional probability of an outcome j of a subsequent von Neumann measurement conditional
on i, and d is the Hilbert space dimension associated with the system. But, this probability
s(j) differs from the Born rule probability q(j) that applies if the SIC is not performed. In
particular,
q(j) = (d+ 1)s(j)− 1. (5)
10 So far SICs have been found for dimensions up to 151, with several sparse analytic proofs up to 323.
See Fuchs et al. (2017) and the references therein.
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Putting these expressions together, we arrive at the Essential Representation of the Born
rule:
q(j) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)r(j|i)− 1. (6)
The QBist maintains that the Essential Representation (equation 6) provides a more
perspicuous version of the Born rule. Whereas the standard version of the Born rule relates
a quantum state to the probability of a measurement outcome, the Essential Representation
expresses a relation between probabilities associated with different sequences of measure-
ments. According to the QBist, such probabilities should be understood as subjective
degrees of belief, and hence, the Essential Representation functions as a kind of coherence
constraint analogous to the axioms of (classical) probability theory.11 Moreover, this ver-
sion of the Born rule allegedly “correlates with something that one might want to call ‘real’
” (Fuchs, 2017b, p.6), and hence, we may wish to regard QBism as at least committed to
this minimal claim about external reality.12 It is also worth noting that Fuchs claims the
dimension d of the Hilbert space associated with a physical system—which appears in the
Essential Representation—also indicates an objective feature of reality. In particular, it
reflects a “previously unnoticed capacity inherent in all matter” (Fuchs, 2010, p.23).13
Sophisticated scientific realism allows for a range of positions with the Mirroring Ac-
count acting as a limit case. The present suggestion is that we locate QBism toward the
opposite end of the spectrum—in which almost nothing in the model corresponds to an
element of reality. One may wonder whether a view may be appropriately regarded as
11 I will return to this point in section 4.1 below.
12 What is intended by Fuchs here is far from clear. One might try to explicate this idea as a form of
structural realism: the Born rule represents an aspect of the structure of our world. After all, structural
realists frequently associate structure with what is encoded in the equations of physical theories. E.g.:
“On the structural realist view what Newton really discovered are the relationships between phenomena
expressed in the mathematical equations of his theory” (Worrall, 1989, p.122).
13 See section 4.2.
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consistent with scientific realism. For some, scientific realism is equated with a belief in
the unobservable entities posited by our best scientific theories. We’ve seen that a natu-
ral way of implementing this idea in the context of contemporary physics—the Mirroring
Account—is problematic. However, one may reasonably wonder whether a view that re-
jects so much of the apparent ontological commitments of quantum theory retains any
significant portion of this motivating idea.
Another motivating idea for realists is the “no-miracles” argument, which contends that
(approximate) truth is required to explain the empirical success of our scientific theories.
Moving away from the linguistic notion of truth as successful reference, we may capture
this idea as the intuition that a model must reflect something in the world for its successful
application to be unsurprising. Again, we may wonder whether merely latching onto one
(albeit fairly central) feature of the world—the Born rule—is sufficient to explain the
astonishing empirical success of quantum theory. This may lead the sophisticated scientific
realist to impose a threshold of ontological commitment, under which a position no longer
qualifies as realist. On such a view, it’s unlikely that QBism will meet this standard.
Even if we put this issue to one side, there are further worries with adopting this
perspective on QBism. The main one is that the resulting view is deeply uninformative.
On this understanding, QBism posits an external reality and claims that the Born rule
is (somehow) true of it. If there is nothing more to say, this has the effect of leaving
the metaphysics of our world largely unconstrained. This leads to a view in which reality
is fundamentally “unspeakable”(Timpson, 2008) or “ineffable”(Brown, 2017). Thus, the
metaphysician is free to speculate on what the world is like, which could lead to radi-
cally different ontological pictures. For example, one might arrive at Berkeleyian idealism
(Brown, 2017), Cartwrightian dispositionalism (Timpson, 2008), Kantianism (Mohrhoff,
2014) or countless other views.
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Thus, the standard picture of scientific realism is an unhappy fit with QBism. The naïve
Mirroring Account flatly rules it out and even a more sophisticated variety of realism—
one that allows for differential ontological commitment—is problematic in the context of
QBism. If QBism is a genuine form a scientific realism, it cannot be in virtue of quantum
models reflecting features of the world. The vague appeal to the real correlates of the Born
rule (and Hilbert space dimension) is too thin a basis to support the realist’s demands
for explanation and understanding. One possible conclusion is that QBism simply isn’t a
realist view, despite the urging of its proponents. But, there is some reason to resist this
implication and instead challenge the vision of scientific realism on offer. After all, QBism
rejects the idea that an interpretation of quantum theory is exhausted by what it tells us
about external reality. It is unsurprising, then, that it is vague and uninformative when
cast in these terms. For the QBist, while it may be true that we can glean some modest
claims about such a reality from quantum theory, these are downstream consequences of
the interpretation rather than its essence. This explains why the ineffable world isn’t a
problem for the QBist; understanding what the theory is telling us is divorced from the
project of giving a metaphysics.
4 Perspectival Normative Realism
The difficulties that beset the sophisticated scientific realist understanding of QBism sug-
gest that we need a fundamentally different approach to capture what is distinctive about
the view. QBists are not simply rejecting the representational status of much of the quan-
tum formalism; if they were, critics would be correct in comparing the view to a version of
instrumentalism. A more charitable interpretation seeks to take seriously two key aspects
of the view that have been ignored thus far: (1) quantum theory is always applied from
a perspective and (2) the Born rule functions as a normative constraint on one’s beliefs.
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Taking these features to heart suggests a view I call perspectival normative realism. The
aim of this section is to sketch the position and assess its claim to scientific realism.
QBists emphasize the first-personal nature of quantum theory as one of the central
tenets of QBism. In distinguishing his view from the Everettian interpretation of Wallace
(2012), Fuchs notes that “...this is one of the most distinguished differences between Everett
and QBism. ‘QBism don’t do third-person!’ For QBism, all of quantum theory is first-
person for the person who happens to be using it” (Fuchs, 2017a, p.22). A common feature
of the standard and sophisticated varieties of scientific realism discussed above is that (some
features of) models should correspond to the world in a perspective-independent sense. The
Mirroring Account would have it that there is a mapping from each element of scientific
model to an element of reality. This implies that quantum models provide something like
a “God’s eye” description of the world. Sophisticated scientific realism loosens the fit
between models and world, but retains the idea—to switch metaphors—of a “view from
nowhere.” Does QBism’s rejection of this framework for thinking about quantum theory
make the view incompatible with scientific realism?
First, consider the perspectival aspect of QBism. The idea that quantum theory is
always applied from the perspective of some agent seems to be in tension with its objective
truth. Standard scientific realism requires (approximate) objective truth as part of its
epistemic claim and model-based approaches require some appropriate mapping between
models and the world. If quantum models apply only from a certain perspective, it’s hard
to see how any kind of scientific realism is appropriate. However, a number of philosophers
have sought to develop realist views that incorporate ineliminable perspectivalism. Giere
(2010), for example, argues that scientific observation and theorizing is always carried out
from a perspective, but is nevertheless capable of providing partial accounts of objective
reality. More recently, others such as Massimi (2018) and Teller (2018) have developed their
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own versions of perspectival realism. These views share the desire to allow for a plurality of
models, applied from different perspectives, to faithfully represent the world. QBism also
advocates a kind of pluralism: different agents will often assign different quantum states to
the same system. While such pluralism invites certain challenges, it’s far from clear that
it undermines a position’s claim to realism.
In the specific case of quantum theory, Rovelli’s relational approach (Rovelli, 1996,
1997) provides another way of combining perspectivalism and realism. On Rovelli’s view,
there are no observer-independent properties, rather, all properties are possessed relative to
some observer.14 Despite its essential appeal to observer perspectives, Rovelli’s relational
interpretation still qualifies as a realist interpretation according to a familiar standard: it
provides a description of the quantum world capable of explaining the success of quantum
theory. Of course, there are important differences between perspectival scientific realism
and Rovelli’s relational approach, on the one hand, and QBism on the other. However,
these cases show that the perspectival aspect of QBism needn’t disqualify it as a realist
position.
A second crucial feature of QBism is its emphasis on normativity. This is a point
QBism shares with other non-ontic approaches, such as Healey’s pragmatism, which em-
phasizes that the primary role of quantum theory is prescriptive rather than descriptive.15
An important difference between the two views is in what they take the normative content,
or prescriptions, of quantum theory to be. For Healey, an agent’s quantum state ascrip-
tions taken individually are subject to normative constraints; there is an objective fact
14 Note that, for Rovelli, an “observer” is any physical system (microscopic or macroscopic) capable of
carrying information about a quantum system.
15 Of course, there is an sense in which any interpretation has the normative implication that one should
expect to find what the quantum formalism predicts. However, on many interpretations, such normative
claims follow from the truth of the description of reality the theory is taken to provide. By contrast, on
QBism (and other non-ontic views), quantum normative claims do not follow from a description of reality
in any straightforward sense. (See section 4.1.)
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about which quantum state an agent should ascribe in a given physical context. QBists,
however, only recognize a relational normative constraint in the Born rule (in the form of
the Essential Representation). As Fuchs (2017a) says, “[n]othing is sacred except that [an
agent] should strive to satisfy the Born Rule for all probabilities” (p.13). What both views
share is that quantum theory imposes objective normative constraints on all agents (see
Healey (2017a)).
What are the implications of this for scientific realism? Note that in other contexts some
are happy to regard as “realism” a position that takes normative claims as objectively true
even without any accompanying descriptive metaphysics. In ethics, for instance, Scanlon
and Parfit defend versions of moral realism that explicitly reject the demand for moral
metaphysics.
...the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about what
the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a prac-
tical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do. Metaphysical
questions about the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong are impor-
tant only if answers to them are required in order to show how these judgments
can have this practical significance. (Scanlon, 1998, p.2)
For Scanlon, moral metaphysics is only relevant to the extent that it is needed to account
for the prescriptions of morality. For QBists, who view quantum theory normatively, the
parallel point is that quantum metaphysics is only relevant to the extent that one needs
it to account for the prescriptions of quantum theory—i.e., the constraints imposed by
the Born rule. As long as one can provide such an account, there are some grounds for
regarding the view as a form of scientific realism. After all, it maintains that the dictates
of quantum theory are objective and is able to say why they are important.
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4.1 Grounding Normativity
QBism maintains that the significance of the Born rule—formulated purely in terms of
subjective probabilities—is to tell us what we have reason to do. If this role can be
sustained without getting involved in metaphysical questions, then QBism can maintain
some measure of objectivity without making any claims about external reality. However,
there is an obvious problem with such a claim in the context of quantum theory (whether
it is successful in ethics is another question): How, without providing a description of the
world, can we say that we have reason to do what the Born rule prescribes? Without an
answer to this question, the scientific realist will be unsatisfied as the central (normative)
content of the theory is left unaccounted for.
One strategy for grounding the normative prescriptions issued by quantum theory is
inductive in nature. It says that we should do as quantum theory recommends because (1)
this is what it is to accept quantum theory and (2) we should accept quantum theory on
the basis of its past success. This is the approach of Healey (2017b).
To accept quantum theory is to commit oneself to setting credence in each
significant canonical magnitude claim equal to the probability specified by a
legitimate application of the Born rule based on the best available quantum
model, in the absence of more direct access to the truth value of the claim.
(Healey, 2017b, p.131)
He goes on to defend point (2):
The strongest reason to accept quantum theory is provided by the success of its
applications in predicting and explaining physical phenomena of a statistical
nature. If we set credences in accordance with the Born rule we are led to
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expect and can come to understand the patterns displayed by these statistics.
(Healey, 2017b, p.131)
However, it’s not clear that this strategy is available to the QBist. First, measurement
outcomes are not objective features of reality according to QBism, so there are no objec-
tive frequencies to appeal to. Each agent will have their own memories of measurement
experiences, which are the result of their interactions with the world, but will differ be-
tween agents. Second, the Born rule alone doesn’t make any predictions. One needs to
supplement the Born rule with a quantum state ascription—or the probability of another
measurement outcome in the Essential Representation—to arrive at a specific probability.
This relational nature of the Born rule means that measurement statistics cannot bear on
it directly. This isn’t a problem for Healey, as he maintains that quantum state ascription
is objective (though relational), but QBists demur. So, it seems QBism lacks the resources
to offer an inductive grounding of the Born rule.
Instead, QBists adopt a strategy for grounding normativity that borrows from the sub-
jectivist tradition in probability. Bruno de Finetti famously denied that there is anything in
external reality corresponding to our judgments of probabilities, and hence, was compelled
to offer an alternative account of the axioms of probability theory. This alternative was
the Dutch book approach, which views the probability axioms as coherence constraints. In
terms of betting behavior, if one doesn’t adhere to the axioms, they will be vulnerable to a
“Dutch book”: a series of fair bets in which they are guaranteed to lose money regardless of
which outcomes obtain (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937). Of course, there needn’t be any
actual “Dutch bookies” lurking. The point is rather that the possibility of such sequences
of bets reveals an internal inconsistency in one’s degrees of belief.
Fuchs and Schack (2013) argue that the Essential Representation of the Born rule
should be viewed in along the same lines:
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It expresses a kind of ‘empirically extended coherence’ not implied by Dutch-
book coherence alone, but formally similar to the kind of relation one gets from
Dutch-book coherence. (Fuchs and Schack, 2013, p.1702)
The proposal is to afford the Born rule a similar status to the axioms of probability theory
taken subjectively; if we don’t follow the Born rule in our subjective degrees of belief, we
are being incoherent. In terms of betting behavior, violating the Born rule opens one up
to the possibility of a Dutch book that guarantees a sure loss. There is a crucial difference
between the cases, however: the quantum Dutch book, unlike the standard Dutch book,
requires more than logic and mathematics. The quantum Dutch book applies only in a
world relevantly similar to ours—one in which quantum theory provides a good guide for
agents in it.
But what is it about our world that makes the Born rule the objectively correct coher-
ence constraint? QBists have two sorts of replies to this question. First, they may leave
this as a brute feature of reality. That the Born rule acts as a coherence constraint is the
limit of what we can say about the world. As Fuchs says, it is “nature’s whisper” (Fuchs,
2017b, p.6). Sometimes QBists express a desire to say more, but note that QBism is an
active research project, and as such, doesn’t have all of the answers at present. So, a sec-
ond approach is to seek out the features of our world that necessitate the use of the Born
rule. One way to do this would be to derive the Born rule from logic and mathematics
supplemented with a minimal empirical claim. However, it’s hard to see what resources
the QBist has at their disposal for this task. For instance, consider the approach of a
non-QBist, Pitowsky (2003), who argues that quantum probability (i.e., the Born rule)
follows from rational betting on quantum gambles. The empirical premise in Pitowsky’s
derivation is the assumption that the algebra formed by the outcomes of incompatible
4 Perspectival Normative Realism 21
quantum measurements has a non-Boolean structure.16 But, such a claim is incompatible
with QBism’s subjective understanding of measurement outcomes. So, while such a deriva-
tion may eventually be possible, it’s presently unclear what empirical premises would be
involved. At present, then, QBism must rest content with the first approach: it is a brute
fact that the Born rule acts as a coherence constraint.
This picture may be unsatisfying for traditional scientific realists, but recall that
QBism’s primary focus is not describing reality, so it’s unsurprising that it’s unsatisfying
by this metric. It is the burden of a normative theory to ground its normative claims—to
give an account of their reason-giving force—and the Dutch book approach does this. The
Born rule gives us reasons to set our credences as it prescribes because it’s an objective
coherence constraint for agents in a world like ours.
In sum, QBism should be understood as a perspectival normative realism according to
which quantum theory is prescriptive rather than descriptive, and perspectival rather than
applied from the God’s eye view. Whether such a position counts as realism depends on the
existence of grounds for the normative claims involved in quantum theory, so understood.
The inductive approach isn’t available to the QBist, but the Dutch book approach provides
another option. For now, QBism is unable to identify the specific features of our world
that ground its use, but the Dutch book approach may nevertheless account for why we
should set our credences in accordance with the Born rule.
16 More specifically, a quantum gamble proceeds in four stages:
1. A single physical system is prepared by the bookie.
2. A finite setM of incompatible measurements is announced by the bookie, and the agent is asked to
place bets on possible outcomes of each one of them.
3. One of the measurements in the set M is chosen by the bookie and the money placed on all other
measurements is promptly returned to the agent.
4. The chosen measurement is performed and the agent gains or loses in accordance with his bet on
that measurement.
The empirical assumption is that the quantum gambler is aware of the Boolean algebras corresponding
to the outcomes of two incompatible measurements. When considered together, these outcomes form a
non-Boolean algebra (Pitowsky, 2003, pp. 396–397).
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4.2 The Participatory Universe
The discussion thus far has largely ignored another feature of QBism that may pertain
to its viability as a form of realism. Inspired by John Wheeler, QBists have sought to
emphasize the “participatory” aspect of quantum theory.
When an experimentalist reaches out and touches a quantum system—the pro-
cess usually called quantum ‘measurement’—that process gives rise to a birth.
It gives rise to a little act of creation. And it is how those births or acts of cre-
ation impact the agent’s expectations for other such births that is the subject
matter of quantum theory. (Fuchs, 2017b, p.9)
This talk of measurements as acts of creation suggests a metaphysical picture in which
we construct the world via our interactions with it. This may be further supported by
consideration of the role played by Hilbert space dimension, which figures in the Essential
Representation and which Fuchs (2010) describes as a “universal capacity” of quantum
systems. Indeed, Timpson (2008) suggests an ontology of primitive capacities on the basis
of such considerations. Now, there is nothing obviously anti-realist about a metaphysics in
which humans build the world bit by bit via their interactions with it—if quantum theory
is telling us that this is how reality operates, then as realists we had better endorse it.
But, such a picture does raise a number of questions. If agents construct reality via
their measurements, how do we make sense of different agents performing different mea-
surements with different results? Indeed, the case of Wigner’s friend—usually taken to
support epistemic approaches like QBism—would seem to lead to a paradoxical situation
in which the world is more than one way, or in which Wigner and his friend occupy different
worlds. Fortunately, these puzzles are avoided when we recall the perspectival aspect of
QBism discussed above.
4 Perspectival Normative Realism 23
According to QBism, the primary function of quantum theory is to guide agents in their
beliefs, not to describe external reality. This means it is a mistake to elevate what it says
about an individual agent’s experiences to the level of a God’s eye description of the world.
Indeed, a central tenet of the view is that quantum theory can provide no such God’s eye
description. Thus, while it may be true from the perspective of an individual agent that
she creates the world via her measurements, this should not be taken as a metaphysical
proposal about external reality.
By way of analogy, consider the approach to time found in Ismael (2016). On Ismael’s
view, temporal experience (the passage or “flow” of time) is a genuine feature of situated
agents, but that doesn’t mean we need to add anything to our metaphysics—a “growing
block” or “moving spotlight”—rather, we can understand passage as a result of a human
agent with certain perceptual capacities being embedded in a world like ours. Crucially,
this doesn’t imply that temporal experience is illusory, but simply that it is perspectival.17
Similarly, the QBist can say that for an agent situated in a quantum world measurements
are little acts of creation and that quantum theory will provide objective advice for what to
expect of the next act of creation. The core claim of QBism is that this situated perspective
is the important one for thinking about quantum theory. It is here that quantum theory
is intended to apply, not as a guide for philosophers constructing a metaphysics.18 But
granting the QBist all of this still leaves the metaphysics wide open. As noted in section 3.1,
the constraints on external reality imposed by quantum theory are quite weak.
17 “To think that accepting the Block Universe as an accurate representation of time as it appears [from
a God’s eye view] means rejecting passage, or flow, or openness, as illusory is like thinking that accepting
a map as a non-perspectival representation of space means that you are under an illusion that anything is
nearby.”(Ismael, 2016, p.119)
18 Again the analogy with temporal experience is apt. “I think that philosophers are overly inclined to
think that everyone is a metaphysician. I think that many of the people I know best never asked the
question “What is time?” in a form that demands a metaphysical answer.”(Ismael, 2016, p.120, n.32) On
the current proposal, QBism answers the question “What is quantum theory?” in a similarly ametaphysical
manner.
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Thus, the QBist can say both that (a) agents create their own worlds by performing
measurements and (b) agents exist in a single reality. The former should be viewed as
a claim from the situated perspective while the latter should be viewed as a claim about
objective reality. Now, it may be thought that QBism’s rejection of the God’s eye perspec-
tive renders QBists unable to endorse claim (b), but this cannot be right. For as we have
seen, QBists wish to claim that there is an external reality independent of our thoughts of
it (this is what kicks back when we prod it) and that we can know certain things about it
(i.e., that it supports our use of the Born rule). The denial of a God’s eye description is a
claim about the limits of quantum theory, not the impossibility of metaphysics.
5 Conclusion: Meeting Realist Demands
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the relation of QBism to scientific realism.
The conclusion we have reached is partially negative: standard ways of thinking about
scientific realism are an unhappy fit with QBism. It is flatly inconsistent with the naïve
“mirroring” account, and cast in terms of a more plausible “sophisticated” form of realism,
QBism tells us preciously little about the world. Moreover, these ways of thinking about
realism are a poor fit with QBism’s perspectival and normative aspects. Perspectival
normative realism aims to preserve the realist’s demand for objective truth while taking
these features seriously.
Realist critics of QBism often complain that the position is explanatorily inadequate—
that there are numerous phenomena that it’s incapable of accounting for.
...QBism seems explanatorily inert. For scientific explanations typically explain
phenomena in terms of underlying mechanisms. Here is a simple example. Why
is the Sun able to produce so much energy over such a long period of time?
(McQueen, 2017, p.7)
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McQueen (2017) goes on to argue that QBism can provide no underlying physical mech-
anism responsible for the sun’s energy production (presumably because the nuclear pro-
cesses involve quantum models which fail to describe reality according to QBism). But,
it’s question-begging to demand of QBism that it provides causal-mechanistic explanations
of quantum phenomena, given that one of its central features is a rejection of quantum
theory’s alleged descriptive role. Moreover, QBism can offer a certain kind of explanation
of phenomena in the scope of quantum theory: the QBist can note that quantum theory
tells agents that they should expect to find certain things. McQueen considers such an ex-
planation of his case, but quickly rejects it for failing to account for why we should expect
these phenomena to occur (ibid.).
In addressing this worry, we may again profitably compare the case of moral realism.
In the passage quoted above, Scanlon goes on to distinguish two motivations for asking
whether moral judgments are about something “real”:
One worry would be that there may be no right answer to questions of right
and wrong... A second interpretation of the charge that judgments of right and
wrong are not about anything ‘real’ would take it as the claim that they should
not have this importance. This is a charge that any account of the reason-giving
force of judgments of right and wrong needs to meet. (Scanlon, 1998, pp.2–3)
Applied to QBism, the first worry is that without offering an adequate description of the
world, the QBist cannot maintain that there are objectively correct answers to questions
about how to set our credences. The second worry is that only such a description can
account for the reason-giving force of quantum theory and the Born rule. QBism meets
the first challenge by regarding the Born rule as an objective coherence constraint. While
there aren’t correct answers to individual probability judgments, there are correct answers
to relational or conditional probability judgments—namely, they must conform to the Born
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rule. The second challenge is met by the Dutch book approach. The prescriptions of the
Born rule have importance because all rational agents are compelled to adhere to them,
in the same manner as the axioms of subjective probability theory. According to QBism,
quantum theory provides correct answers to questions about what we should do, answers
which provide us with reasons to do as they prescribe. Thus, it would seem that QBism
can meet the realist demands appropriate to a normative theory.
References
Bacciagaluppi, G. (2014). A critic looks at QBism. In New Directions in the Philosophy
of Science, pages 403–416. Springer.
Brown, H. R. (2017). The reality of the wavefunction: Old arguments and new. Ontol-
ogy studies – Outstanding papers from the San Sebastian International Congresses of
Ontology, page forthcoming.
Caves, C. M., Fuchs, C. A., and Schack, R. (2002). Quantum probabilities as Bayesian
probabilities. Physical review A, 65(2):022305.
De Finetti, B. (1937). Foresight: Its logical laws, its subjective sources. In Henry E. Kyburg,
H. E. S., editor, Studies in Subjective Probability. Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Co.,
Huntington, NY.
DeBrota, J. B., Fuchs, C. A., and Stacey, B. C. (2018). Symmetric informationally complete
measurements identify the essential difference between classical and quantum. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1805.08721.
Earman, J. (2018). Quantum Bayesianism assessed. Unpublished manuscript.
Earman, J. and Norton, J. (1987). What price spacetime substantivalism. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 38:515–525.
Friederich, S. (2013). In defence of non-ontic accounts of quantum states. Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
44(2):77–92.
Fuchs, C. A. (2010). QBism, the perimeter of quantum Bayesianism. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1003.5209.
5 Conclusion: Meeting Realist Demands 27
Fuchs, C. A. (2017a). Notwithstanding Bohr, the reasons for QBism. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.03483.
Fuchs, C. A. (2017b). On participatory realism. In Information and Interaction, pages
113–134. Springer.
Fuchs, C. A., Hoang, M. C., and Stacey, B. C. (2017). The SIC question: History and
state of play. Axioms, 6(3):21.
Fuchs, C. A. and Schack, R. (2013). Quantum-Bayesian coherence. Rev. Mod. Phys.,
85:1693–1715.
Giere, R. N. (2010). Scientific perspectivism. University of Chicago Press.
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy
of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hagar, A. (2003). A philosopher looks at quantum information theory. Philosophy of
Science, 70(4):752–775.
Healey, R. (2007). Gauging what’s real: The conceptual foundations of contemporary gauge
theories. Oxford University Press.
Healey, R. (2012). Quantum theory: A pragmatist approach. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 63(4):729–771.
Healey, R. (2017a). Quantum-Bayesian and pragmatist views of quantum theory. In Zalta,
E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, spring 2017 edition.
Healey, R. (2017b). The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Healey, R. (2018). Pragmatist quantum realism. Forthcoming in a collection on Realism
and the Quantum, eds. French and Saatsi.
Ismael, J. (2016). From physical time to human time. In Dolev, Y. and Roubach, M.,
editors, Cosmological and Psychological Time, pages 107–124. Springer International
Publishing, Cham.
Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48(1):19–49.
Leeds, S. (1999). Gauges: Aharonov, Bohm, Yang, Healey. Philosophy of Science,
66(4):606–627.
Massimi, M. (2018). Four kinds of perspectival truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 96(2):342–359.
5 Conclusion: Meeting Realist Demands 28
McQueen, K. J. (2017). Is QBism the future of quantum physics? arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.02030.
Mermin, N. D. (2014). QBism in the new scientist. arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1573.
Mohrhoff, U. (2014). QBism: a critical appraisal. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.3312.
Norsen, T. (2016). Quantum solipsism and non-locality. Quantum Nonlocality and Reality,
50:204–237.
Norton, J. (2011). The hole argument. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Fall 2011 edition.
Nounou, A. (2003). A fourth way to the Aharonov-Bohm effect. In Brading, K. and
Castellani, E., editors, Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, pages 174–99.
Cambridge University Press.
Pitowsky, I. (2003). Betting on the outcomes of measurements: a Bayesian theory of
quantum probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34(3):395–414.
Pooley, O. (2013). Substantivalist and relationalist approaches to spacetime. In Batter-
man, R., editor, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, pages 522–586. Oxford
University Press.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. Routledge, New York.
Pusey, M. F., Barrett, J., and Rudolph, T. (2012). On the reality of the quantum state.
Nature Physics, 8(6):475.
Ramsey, F. P. (1926). Truth and probability. In Henry E. Kyburg, H. E. S., editor, Studies
in Subjective Probability. Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Co., Huntington, NY.
Redhead, M. (2003). The interpretation of gauge symmetry. Symmetries in Physics:
philosophical reflections, pages 124–139.
Rovelli, C. (1996). Relational quantum mechanics. International Journal of Theoretical
Physics, 35(8):1637–1678.
Rovelli, C. (1997). Half way through the woods. In Earman, J. and Norton, J., editors,
The Cosmos of Science, pages 180–223. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg.
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press.
Spekkens, R. W. (2007). Evidence for the epistemic view of quantum states: A toy theory.
Physical Review A, 75(3):032110.
5 Conclusion: Meeting Realist Demands 29
Teller, P. (2018). Referential and perspectival realism. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal
for the History and Philosophy of Science, 9(1):151–164.
Timpson, C. G. (2008). Quantum Bayesianism: A study. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39(3):579–609.
van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Wallace, D. (2012). The emergent multiverse: Quantum theory according to the Everett
interpretation. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43(1-2):99–124.
